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Alternatives to the Tort System for the 
Nonmedical Professions: Can They Do the Job? 
Kenneth S. Abraham* 
This Article evaluates several alternatives to the current 
system of resolving professional liability disputes: (1) New com- 
pensation and liability systems, both mandatory and elective; (2) 
the sharing of responsibility for professional error; and (3) vari- 
ous informal types of claim resolution. The complex conceptual 
and practical problems that would have to be solved before 
mandatory strict liability or no-fault compensation systems 
could be established are first discussed. There follows an explo- 
ration of the advantages that might be obtained more effectively 
through elective no-fault coverage made available to profession- 
als and clients, and a sketch of some of the less radical ways in 
which the sharing of responsibility for error by professionals and 
clients could produce desirable effects. Finally, the Article de- 
tails the benefits of pretrial screening and voluntary binding ar- 
bitration, and compares the benefits with the potential costs of 
these informal approaches. 
Consideration of reform has been prompted by several dis- 
satisfactions with the current system of handling professional li- 
ability disputes. The professions themselves face periodic crises 
in the availability and high cost of liability insurance. These cri- 
ses are the product of uncertainty about a future portended by 
recent changes in the law governing the right to compensation 
for professional error, an increasing number of claims, and a rise 
in the average severity of claims. Another cluster of concerns is 
related to the legal standard by which professionals are judged 
and its application in the courts. Critics of the present system 
cite as weaknesses the expense of trial by jury,' the unrealism of 
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. An earlier version of this 
Article was presented at the Symposium on Professional Liability, sponsored by the 
Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, University of Maryland, and the Academy for 
Contemporary Problems. The author wishes to thank the Center and the Academy for 
their support. 
1. See, e.g., PENNSYLVANIA SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS, ANALYSIS OF PROFESSIONAL LIA- 
BILITY INSURANCE ISSUES IN PENNSYLVANIA 8 (1975) (costa of defense); CALIFORNIA C TI- 
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evaluating a professional's conduct in such a context, and the 
unpredictability of jury decisions. Finally, society has come to 
find uncompensated injury less and less tolerable.2 This gradual 
change in social philosophy draws attention to the fact that the 
law awards compensation only to some of those who suffer injury 
or loss caused by professional services and denies compensation 
to others. Because thinking about reforms designed to remedy 
these dissatisfactions is still at an early stage, this Article will 
discuss not only the potential advantages of reform, but also the 
difficulties that will have to be overcome if reform is to be 
successful. 
Two separate issues should be kept in mind. The first con- 
cerns factual questions: What are the causes of recent develop- 
ments, and what will be the effect of proposed changes? Without 
answers to these questions, it will be difficult to focus on the 
features of the current system, if any, that are proper candidates 
for reform. The second and separate issue concerns matters of 
principle: Once the facts are known (or predicted), on what basis 
shall they be evaluated? A "defect" for one individual or group 
may be an "advantage" for another. 
A. Mandatory Approaches 
Tort reform in such fields as products liability, worker's 
compensation, and no-fault automobile insurance has been 
achieved in part by manipulating three elements to achieve de- 
sired goals.s The first element is the compensable event-the 
behavior, condition, or occurrence triggering a right to compen- 
sation. The second is the payment mechanism-the means by 
which the entitled party is actually compensated. The third is 
the measure of compensation awarded the claimant. Each 
ZENS' COMM'N ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY BALANCE 94-104 (1977) (M 
system generally); REPORT OF THE SPECIAL ADVISORY PANEL ON MEDICAL MALPRACTICE, 
STATE OF NEW YORK 164 (1976) [hereinafter cited as ADVISORY PANEL REPORT] (medical 
malpractice cases). 
2. Perhaps the best illustration of the application of this philosophy to the law of 
torts can be found in the work of Fleming James, Jr. See F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE 
LAW OF TORTS (1956). 
3. For analysis of the law in each of these fields, see L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, 
PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1980); A. LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION FOR OCCUPATIONAL I - 
mres  AND DEATH (1972); J. O'CONNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW NO-FAULT AND BE- 
YOND (1975). 
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change has altered the way traditional negligence law treated 
one or more of these elements. 
Although it developed somewhat differently, professional li- 
ability law is now a close relative of traditional negligence law.' 
The compensable event in professional liability is an injury or 
economic loss to a client (or a limited set of third parties) caused 
by the professional's malpractice-his failure to exercise the care 
or skill expected of a practitioner in his field.The payment 
mechanism is usually third-party liability insurance-a contract 
by which an insurance company agrees with the professional to 
pay judgments against the latter up to a specified maximum. 
The measure of compensation is full tort damages-all of the 
claimant's out-of-pocket expenses plus those general damages 
necessary to make him whole. 
Alterations in each category could produce various changes 
in the professional liability system. The compensable event 
could be modified to replace the malpractice standard with a 
more liberal right to compensation. This would permit recovery 
by more people, potentially with greater speed and less expense 
than is currently possible. Such a new system could impose 
strict liability on the professional for the expanded set of corn- 
pensable events. Alternatively, it could render the professional 
immune from liability and require clients to purchase no-fault 
insurance against loss. The measure of compensation could also 
be altered, limiting recovery to something less than full tort 
damages in order to finance a liberalized right to compensation. 
To mandate such changes at  this stage, however, would be 
premature. It is not at all clear that a liberalized right to recov- 
ery is needed in order to compensate those whom it is desirable 
to compensate, including some who may not currently be enti- 
tled to compensation. Imposing strict liability on professionals 
would render them liable for many losses that they could not 
avoid and could not appropriately be said to have caused. Sub- 
stitution of client-purchased no-fault insurance for tort liability 
might simplify the claims process, but it would relieve profes- 
sionals of financial responsibility for their errors at a time when 
the public calls for more, not less, responsibility from profession- 
als. A reduction in the measure of compensation could finance 
payment to more persons. But even if the class of recipients 
4. For some detail of this history, see Hawkins, Retaining Traditional Tort Liabil- 
ity In The Nonmedical Professions, 1981 B.Y.U. L. REV. 33. 
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could be properly defined, its members would be compensated at 
the cost of denying full compensation to those now entitled to 
recover all their losses. These are serious problems that require 
detailed examination. Although systematic reform would un- 
doubtedly involve a combination of such changes, it may be use- 
ful to focus separately on the compensable event, the payment 
mechanism, and the measure of compensation in order to isolate 
the implications of the available alternatives in each category. 
1. The compensable event 
At least one of two goals would underlie any liberalization 
of the compensable event: (1) The desire to facilitate recovery 
by those entitled to it even under current legal standards, and 
(2) the need to compensate other persons who are not entitled to 
recovery under current standards. Many of the phenomena that 
led to the adoption of the three major no-fault systems-strict 
products liability, worker's compensation, and automobile no- 
fault--do not now affect nonmedical professional liability.' But 
two other factors that are not fully understood might well argue 
for liberalization of the compensable event in this field. 
First, there may be a significant number of persons entitled 
to recovery who never file a claim because the claim's small size 
prevents them from obtaining an attorney willing to take the 
case. There is, for instance, a widespread belief that many vic- 
tims of medical malpractice encounter this diffi~ulty.~ If there is 
a large group whose claims against nonmedical professionals are 
similarly foreclosed, a no-fault system might be in order. Sec- 
ondly, there may also be a large number of persons who suffer 
losses caused by professional services, but who are not entitled 
to compensation because their losses are not caused by malprac- 
5. Professor Hawkins has indicated that a number of the factors which preceded the 
adoption of worker's compensation and automobile personal injury no-fault statutes are 
absent froamthe context with which this Article is concerned: the difliculty of character- 
izing split second driving decisions in terms of moral fault; the overloading of the judicial 
system with many small claims; the overpayment of the small claims and the underpay- 
ment of the large; and a series of particularly harsh tort doctrines that impeded recovery 
by the employee. See id. at 47-50. 
6. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION A D WELFARE, R PORT OF THE SECRE- 
TARY'S COMMISSION O  MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 100 (1973) [hereinafter cited as SECRE- 
TARY'S COMMISSION REPORT]; ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 161. See also 
Havighurst & Tancredi, "Medical Adversity Insurance9'-A No-Fault Approach to 
Medical Malpractice and Quality Assurance, 1974 INS. L.J. 69,73 (suggesting that many 
potential claimants fail even to recognize that negligence was involved in the injuring 
activity). 
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tice. A properly designed no-fault system could extend compen- 
sation to these individuals. Empirical research into the extent to 
which the provision of professional services is affected by either 
of these problems should therefore have a high priority. 
One factor that certainly weighs in favor of the no-fault ap- 
proach is the inefficiency of the current system. The lengthy and 
individualized scrutiny of a professional's performance as under- 
taken at present is very expensive. Estimates vary, but it ap- 
pears that between fifty-five and eighty percent of the premium 
dollar may be allocated to legal and administrative expenses.' 
Only the remaining twenty to forty-five percent actually com- 
pensates malpractice victims. A no-fault system capable of 
avoiding this inefficiency could have much to recommend it. 
However, designing a no-fault system poses a problem that 
proves toublesome in both principle and practice: how to define 
the compensable event. There are two possible devices-a gen- 
eral definition or a set of specific ones. 
a. A general definition of a compensable event. Worker's 
compensation and automobile no-fault define the compensable 
event in general terms: injuries "arising out of' or "in the course 
of" employment or driving.' These standards ensure against the 
imperfect result-the perfect result being injury-free employ- 
ment or driving. Providing such a guarantee in these fields has 
been feasible because it is relatively easy, both in principle and 
in practice, to interpret the definition in which the guarantee is 
embodied. The definition incorporates a decision of princi- 
ple-that all injuries occurring in and related to the activity 
should be compensable. And as a practical matter, when an in- 
jury does occur in a setting of employment or driving, it is only 
the unusual case in which it does not "arise out of" these 
activities. 
It is not at all clear, however, that a no-fault system of pro- 
7. For estimates of that portion of the premium dollar which is actually paid to 
patients, see CALIFORNIA CITIZENS' COMM'N ON TORT REFORM, RIGHTING THE LIABILITY 
BALANCE 116 (1976); PHYSICIANS CRISIS COMM. [OF DETROIT], COURT DOCKET SURVEY 2 
(1975); O'Connell, An Alternative to Abandoning Tort Liability: Elective No-Fault In- 
surance for Many Kinds of Injuries, 60 MINN. L. REV. 501, 506-09 (1976); Note, Com- 
parative Approaches to Liability for Medical Maloccurrences, 84 YALE L.J. 1141, 1155 
(1975); SUBCOMMI~TEE ON EXECUTIVE R ORGANIZATION OF THE SENATE COMM. ON GOVERN- 
MENT OPERATIONS, 9 1 s ~  CONG.,  ST SESS., MEDICAL MALPRACTICE: TH  PATIENT VERSUS 
THE PHYSICIAN 10 (1969). 
8. See 1 A. LARSON, supra note 3, at 6.00; UNIFORM OTOR VEHICLE REPARATIONS 
ACT 3 2. 
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fessional liability should have such blanket coverage. Consider 
the different kinds of losses that might be compensable under 
such a system. Certain less-than-perfect results are due to a cli- 
ent's desire for something to which he is not entitled or which is 
impossible to achieve. In this category would fall such "losses" 
as an architect's inability to produce a design that the client 
finds both satisfactory and within financial limitations. It is dif- 
ficult to see any reason for mandating compensation in such 
cases. Although such results are less than satisfactory from the 
client's point of view, they are not "losses," as the term is gener- 
ally understood in other no-fault fields. Rather, they are exam- 
ples of a failure to obtain something that was never really avail- 
able. The proper antidote to such disappointments is full 
disclosure of risks at the outset of the professional-client rela- 
tionship. On the other hand, certain unsatisfactory results are in 
theory avoidable (even though not caused by malpractice) and 
can properly be termed "losses." These might include an ac- 
countant's failure to discover a form of corporate fraud specifi- 
cally designed to fool an accountant (and not discoverable by 
following accepted professional procedures) or an attorney's rea- 
sonable judgment not to call a particular witness at a trial when, 
with hindsight, the testimony of the witness would have been 
helpful to his client's case. 
Determining which of such losses ought to be compensable 
is a considerable theoretical task. The factors that legal theorists 
have suggested be considered in allocating losses on a no-fault 
basis vary widely? Unless the decision were made that all losses, 
even those only remotely related to professional services, were to 
be compensable, a general no-fault definition (e.g., "losses aris- 
ing out of the provision of professional services") would be unac- 
ceptably vague.1° Such a definition would leave undetermined 
which less-than-perfect results would be compensable. After 
much adjudication the meaning of such a definition might be- 
come clear, but the confusion that now surrounds the analogous 
problem of defining the defective product in products liability 
9. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Torts, 81 YALE 
L.J. 1055 (1972); Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973); 
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HAW. L. REV. 537 (1972). 
10. For analysis of the weakness of such a definition as applied to medical mal- 
pratice, see Abraham, Medical Malpractice Reform: A Preliminary Analysis, 36 MD. L. 
REV. 489,523-24 (1977); Epstein, Medical Malpractice: Its Cause and Care, in THE ECO- 
NOMICS OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE 245, 260 (S. Rottenberg ed. 1978). 
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law suggests that case-by-case application of a general definition 
is not the most promising way to proceed.ll 
b. Specified compensable events. Having encountered dif- 
ficulty in developing a workable general definition of compen- 
sability, the framers of proposals for no-fault compensation of 
medical adversities turned in another direction: specification of 
the conditions constituting compensable events.12 This approach 
might also be useful in the nonmedical field. By determining in 
advance which events would be compensable, designers of the 
system would make the calculations necessary to determine 
what losses arise out of professional services. 
Various factors could be taken into account in constructing 
the list of compensable events, including (1) the cost of the sys- 
tem (by assessing the frequency of an event's occurrence and the 
ease of distinguishing it from non-compensable events), (2) the 
relative avoidability of an event" (if it is a stict liability rather 
than a first-party no-fault system), and (3) the fairness of im- 
posing liability for a particular kind of loss on professionals or 
requiring clients to insure against its occurrence.14 
Although specifying compensable events might avoid some 
of the conceptual difficulties of case-by-case application of a 
general compensation standard, other problems would remain. 
First, without systematic knowledge of the nature and incidence 
of the adverse results of nonmedical professional services, any 
effort to construct a workable set of compensable events would 
have to be made in ignorance of several factors such as the cost 
of the system, the impact of requiring insurance against certain 
outcomes but not others, and the equity between those compen- 
sated on a no-fault basis and those left to recourse, if any, within 
the tort system.16 Filling these gaps in information with empiri- 
11. For the range of problems generated, see D. Nom & J. PHILLIPS, PRODUCTS 
LIABILITY: CASES AND MATERIALS 6-34, 359-524 (1976). 
12. See Havighurst & Tancredi, note 6 supra. 
13. By including events that are relatively avoidable, the system could disregard the 
question whether in each particular case the event was in fact caused by professional 
services. For discussion of this causation problem, see Epstein, supra note 10, at 264, 
Havighurst, "Medical Adversity Insurance"-Has Its Time Come?, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1233, 
1254-55; Keeton, Compensation for Medical Accidents, 121 U .  PA. L. REV. 590, 614-15 
(1973). 
14. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 6, at  76-82. 
15. If the range of specified compensable events were great, tort liability for all non- 
specified events might be abolished. If the system were to begin more tentatively by 
specifying a limited number of events, tort liability could be abolished for these events 
but retained in connection with any other losses. See Havighurst & Tancredi, supra note 
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cal research and expert analysis within each profession would 
aid the design of the system and provide some evidence of its 
feasibility. 
A second concern would arise if a third-party payment 
mechanism were adopted. Professor Guido Calabresi has termed 
this the substitutability problem-an excessive professional in- 
centive to avoid producing a cornpensable event by unjustifiably 
following a procedure less effective than another because it is 
less likely to produce the event. To avoid encouraging this de- 
fensive practice, unacceptable outcomes of the less effective pro- 
cedures would also have to be cornpensable. It probably would 
be impossible to catalogue in advance all second-choice proce- 
dures for every cornpensable event. But ironically, determining 
case-by-case whether such a procedure was chosen could closely 
resemble deciding whether malpractice has occurred. The mag- 
nitude of the substitutability problem would depend on the 
range of events actually covered by the system. And the net cost 
of the problem could be determined only after comparing the 
substitutability problem under the new system with the costs of 
defensive practice under the current one? 
A final issue to be faced in structuring a system of specified 
cornpensable events is complexity. As protections against the po- 
tential difficulties discussed above are fashioned, the system will 
become complex, generating litigation over borderline questions 
of cornpensability and thereby incurring a portion of the cost, 
inconvenience, and perceived injustice that the system itself is 
designed to avoid. Whether it would be possible to construct a 
sufficiently simple but reasonably comprehensive set of compen- 
sable events must be determined by further study in each of the 
professions. 
2. The payment mechanism 
A financial incentive to avoid producing cornpensable events 
could be created most effectively by requiring professionals to 
pay compensation out of their own pockets. This is true whether 
the cornpensable events are limited to losses caused by malprac- 
tice, or consist of a greater range of losses not necessarily related 
6, at 74. 
16. Although there are a number of studies about the affects of defensive medicine, 
see, e.g., Project, The Medical Malpractice Threat: A Study of Defensive Medicine, 
1971 DUKE L.J. 939, similar studies of the nonmedical professions have not appeared. 
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to fault. Of course, the need to deter malpractice is not strong 
enough to require that professionals pay compensation them- 
selves. They are allowed to purchase insurance against liability 
because a large judgment could impose a severe burden on them, 
their families, and their careers. Insurance shifts this loss into 
wide channels of distribution. Furthermore, insurance not only 
protects the professional, but also assures the successful claim- 
ant of compensation. The permissibility of insurance against lia- 
bility for malpractice reveals the law's ambivalence about the 
whole question of professional fault. Malpractice is faulty behav- 
ior, but not so faulty as to call for the punishment that unin- 
sured liability would constitute. This attitude would argue even 
more strongly for permitting insurance if professionals were also 
obligated to pay compensation for events unrelated to 
malpractice. 
If the cost of liability insurance is linked in some way to the 
professional's liability experience, the financial incentive to per- 
form carefully exists even when the professional is insured 
against liability. Rate classification in the liability insurance of- 
fered most of the professions, however, has been either very 
gross or nonexistent. The number of both claims and insured 
parties is too small to support sophisticated statistical distinc- 
tions among them." A strict liability system, on the other hand, 
might produce enough additional claims to warrant a more de- 
tailed risk and rate classification. When it is not feasible to clas- 
sify risks in detail, sizeable deductions or coinsurance can link 
liability experience and insurance cost. Some of the nonmedical 
professions are now encountering these devices as the cost of full 
coverage rises. Even without such devices, potential liability 
probably tends to affect professional behavior through other 
means, such as the time a professional must spend in defending 
a claim and the fear of the publicity connected with a lawsuit. 
On the other hand, many professionals would question 
whether reliance on potential liability alone promotes proper 
professional performance. Other factors, unaffected by tort lia- 
bility, such as professional pride in the quality of services pro- 
vided, the business advantages of providing high quality ser- 
vices, growing peer group review, and continuing education and 
recertification requirements might promote quality performance 
17. For discussion of these difficulties in pricing medical malpractice liability insur- 
ance, see ADVISORY PANEL REPORT, supra note 1, at 224. 
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even if tort liability were abolished. The effect of potential lia- 
bility on professional behavior needs to be studied in much 
greater detail in order to evaluate this contention. 
Obviously, the smaller the role potential liability plays in 
affecting professional performance, the less difference there will 
be between a third-party strid liability approach and the whole- 
sale substitution of first-party no-fault insurance for tort liabil- 
ity. In neither case will the payment mechanism seriously affect 
professional behavior; in both, the price of insurance will be re- 
flected in the total cost to the client of obtaining professional 
services. Thus, it might make sense to consider abolishing the 
tort liability of professionals. 
The abolition of tort liability would of course eliminate the 
making of claims against professionals. If a loss caused by mal- 
practice continued to be the compensable event, however, pro- 
fessionals would still have to be involved in the claims process 
and many of the current burdens and embarrassements would 
remain. On the other hand, if the problems entailed in defining a 
broader set of compensable events were solved, the profes- 
sional's obligations could be limited to verifying the occurrence 
of compensable events. Clients could then recover compensation 
from their own insurance companies more simply and efficiently 
than from the professional's insurer under a malpractice or strict 
liability system. The savings expected from this approach (to- 
gether with the elimination of general damages in a large group 
of claims) were a major incentive for the adoption of no-fault 
automobile accident compensation systems. 
However, one factor that made mandatory first-party insur- 
ance feasible for automobile accidents is not present in the pro- 
fessional liability context. It was relatively easy to enforce the 
requirement that motorists purchase first-party insurance. Mo- 
torists already were covered by readily convertible third-party 
liability insurance and there was an existing enforcement appa- 
ratus. In contrast, there is neither a readily convertible form of 
insurance already covering clients of professionals nor an ex- 
isting administrative system for enforcing the purchase of such 
insurance.18 Hence, implementing mandatory first-party insur- 
ance could prove to be very cumbersome. 
18. See 4. O'CONNEU, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY 70-71 (1975); Hawkins, supra note 
4, at 49. 
571 TORT LIABILITY ALTERNATIVES 
3. The measure of compensation 
Having determined what occurrences would trigger a right 
to compensation and how to finance it, the framers of a new sys- 
tem would next have to decide on the measure of compensation. 
The most important consideration here is how much the range 
of compensable events has been broadened, for there are strong 
arguments against the payment of full tort damages when the 
right to recovery is liberalized. Any no-fault system worth oper- 
ating will not only broaden the range of compensable events, but 
will also expand the number of persons entitled to compensa- 
tion. If full tort damages are payable for each compensable 
event, the system may become extremely expensive to operate. 
Admittedly, this expense would appear greater than it really is 
because the increase in costs would partly represent a shift of 
existing expenses from individuals suffering losses to all those 
paying premiums to finance the new system. Nevertheless, it is 
unlikely that there would be enough political support to enact 
any mandatory system in which premiums significantly exceed 
those currently paid for professional liability insurance. It is also 
unlikely that any savings gained from eliminating the need to 
prove malpractice in jury trials would be sufficient to prevent 
premiums from exceeding current rates if full compensation 
were afforded to all those suffering losses unrelated to fault. 
The costs of the system could be minimized either by limit- 
ing the range of compensable events or by paying less than full 
tort damages. Both worker's compensation and no-fault automo- 
bile insurance found ready categories of damages to eliminate in 
order to help finance payment to more people: general damages 
for pain and suffering. Claims against nonmedical professionals, 
however, are seldom for personal injury. Rather, the typical 
claim is for economic loss alone. In the absence of a conveniently 
dispensable category of damages, it might be feasible to pay only 
a specified percentage of claimants' full tort damages. Although 
this approach would require a seemingly arbitrary limitation on 
compensation, payment of a percentage of losses may not seem 
so arbitrary when compared with the realities of payment under 
the current system.ls 
19. Currently, if a claim is settled before trial, the settlement figure is a product of 
compromise based on the strength of the claim as well as other subjective factors. If the 
case goes to trial, it may be lost. If plaintiff wins a verdict, it may not necessarily be for 
the amount of "objective" loss actually suffered. And after judgment is paid, plaintiff 
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In sum, the development of no-fault theory in the field of 
professional liability is at a preliminary stage. It remains un- 
known whether nonmedical professional services cause losses 
which ought to be compensated but which do not find redress 
within the current system. Although the inefficiency and incon- 
venience of litigating malpractice claims may argue for reform, 
much work must be done before a no-fault system of any sort 
would be successful. The difficulty of designing a system that 
would facilitate recovery and reduce litigation without introduc- 
ing new problems (and the accompanying cost of resolving them) 
cannot be overlooked. Until developments that promote quality 
professional services-even in the absence of tort liabil- 
ity-reach maturity, it is unlikely that the public would tolerate 
the abolition of professional liability which would be part of a 
first-party insurance approach. 
Perhaps most important, there is reason to wonder whether 
clients, who will ultimately pay a large part of the cost of any 
system, would want mandatory protection against losses due to 
nonnegligent professional services, given what that protection 
could cost. The right to recover for malpractice, together with 
the opportunity to choose and to change one's own attorney, ar- 
chitect, engineer, or accountant may more effectively combine 
the twin goals of providing necessary compensation and encour- 
aging the exercise of skill and care than any of the complicated 
no-fault approaches. For clients and professionals who are inter- 
ested in combining these goals in a different way, the develop- 
ment of elective alternatives has more potential for flexibility 
and fine tuning than a uniform mandatory plan. 
B. Elective Approaches 
One peril of any mandatory reform is that it would impose 
on all professionals and clients a uniform set of rights and obli- 
gations, not tailored to meet the varying needs of the individuals 
concerned. A different approach would allow the professional 
and client to fashion the terms of their relationship concerning 
liability and compensation. Elective no-fault, for example, has 
been championed by Professor Jeffrey O'Connell as an alterna- 
tive to tort liability for losses caused by products and ser~ices.'~ 
usually receives only a specified percentage; the remainder pays counsel fees and 
expenses. 
20. See J. O'CONNELL, note 18 supra. It should be noted that in referring to profes- 
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An elective system for professional services could be either com- 
pletely or partially elective. 
1. Completely elective systems 
A completely elective system would leave to the contracting 
parties-professional and client-authority to specify compensa- 
ble events, the payment mechanism, the measure of compensa- 
tion, and whether tort liability for unspecified events would be 
retained or waived. Where the parties specified payment 
through first-party insurance, the agreement would concern only 
the nature and extent of the client's waiver of tort rights. The 
remaining items could be the subject of any insurance policy 
purchased separately by the client. The fees charged by the pro- 
fessional could vary, depending on the extent of tort liability 
waived by the client and the extent of no-fault or other liability, 
if any, assumed by the professional. 
The completely elective approach has several dangers. Per- 
mitting the professional and client to structure their own com- 
pensation-liability relationship circumvents some of the vexing 
issues that would face those designing a uniform plan. However, 
it does not resolve these issues; it merely transfers them to the 
professional and client. The myriad of available variations would 
make it extraordinarily difficult for either party to make an in- 
formed choice about the advantages and disadvantages of all the 
alternatives or about the proper price for insurance coverage.'l 
Consequently, form contracts would probably be drawn up by 
the insurance industry after consultation with the professions 
concerned. 
The professions would undoubtedly have an interest in in- 
cluding within any list of compensable events those occurrences 
most frequently subject to tort liability (e.g., an attorney's fail- 
ure to file within the applicable period of limitations prescribed 
by statute), while excluding others. If these contracts also re- 
duced the measure of compensation, the result would limit the 
professional's exposure, while providing little concomitant bene- 
fit to the client. Moreover, any attempt by an attorney to induce 
sional services, Professor O'Connell speaks almost exclusively of the health care 
professions. 
21. More than the pricing of the no-fault coverage is involved. Because some partial 
tort waivers will occur, reductions in malpractice liability insurance premiums should 
accompany them. 
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a client to waive existing rights would probably be unethical."' 
Because insurance contracts would be an integral part of even 
the completely elective approach, state insurance commissioners 
would be involved at some stage to represent the interests of the 
public. Whether this would assure fairness of coverage is 
uncertain. 
2. Partially elective systems 
Partially elective systems would permit the parties to mod- 
ify their liability relationship' by contract, but would specify one 
or more terms to be included in the contract between profes- 
sional and client should they elect that approach. If enabling 
legislation specified a list of compensable events, then all the 
burdens of constructing it would be placed on those drafting the 
legislation. But such specification could protect against the dan- 
ger that the events would have the professional orientation de- 
scribed earlier. 
Setting mandatory minimum levels of compensation could 
introduce a similar protection. However, the absence of a readily 
expendable category of tort damages would be as much of a 
problem here as it would be for the planners of a mandatory 
plan. For the design professions, payment of only economic 
losses in that minority of cases involving personal injuries might 
be adequate. In cases of economic loss, a mandatory minimum 
percentage of what would otherwise be the client's full tort dam- 
ages, as described earlier, might be prescribed for all nonper- 
sonal injury claims. The percentage set would not be so arbitrary 
as in a mandatory plan, because it would not be a limit-it 
would only be a minimum that could be adjusted between the 
parties according to their risk preferences and discounted in set- 
ting the fees for services. 
The last element of a partially elective system that might be 
fixed by enabling legislation concerns the relation of any new 
compensation arrangement to traditional tort liability. Legisla- 
tion could require or permit waivers of tort rights by the client 
in consideration of the professional's assumption of certain com- 
pensation obligations. The nature of the other elements fixed by 
the statute would determine the appropriate treatment of tort 
liability. For example, the greater the range of compensable 
events and levels of compensation (whether prescribed by the 
22. See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, D.R. 5-104, 6-102 (A) (1970). 
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statute or adopted by agreement of the parties), the stronger the 
justification for making complete waiver of tort liability a pre- 
requisite to the client's participation in the system. Thus, a sys- 
tem with specified compensable events of moderate scope and 
reduced compensation might require waiver of tort liability for 
losses resulting from the occurrences specified as compensable 
events, but could retain traditional tort liability for other losses. 
On the other hand, a more extensive system with a wider range 
of compensable events and higher minimum compensation 
might require complete waiver of tort liability as a prerequisite 
to participation. 
A different variation could mix tort and no-fault liability 
within individual claims. Professionals could be allowed to pro- 
vide no-fault compensation for damages below a specified dollar 
amount, e.g., $10,000, in return for the client's waiver of tort lia- 
bility in the amount for any claim actually brought? Such a mix 
could provide a simplified and possibly less costly procedure for 
processing small claims. Although professionals would be volun- 
tarily assuming added liability by agreeing to such a mix, sav- 
ings from the simplified claim procedure and elimination of the 
admission of malpractice that some professionals believe is im- 
plicit in settling a claim might be an adequate quid pro quo for 
this added obligation. A great deal more information about the 
configuration of current claims and the nature of adverse results 
in the various fields will have to be obtained before precise pro- 
jections can be made about the effects of these alternatives. 
Finally, any elective system, whether completely or only 
partially optional, would have to deal with a problem resembling 
that of informed consent. Protections would have to be built 
into the system to ensure that both parties understand the 
terms of their waivers of legal rights and to guard against impos- 
ing an elective liability agreement on the client as a condition of 
the professional's accepting employment. Without safeguards, 
the system's effectiveness could be undermined by the selective 
invalidation of the agreements in courts of law? 
23. See J. O'CONNELL, supra note 18, at 104-05. Such coverage would resemble the 
"add-on" coverage now available in certain states that have not adopted mandatory no- 
fault automobile insurance. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. &A, $$ 538-547 (Supp. 1979). 
24. For a discussion of these issues, see O'Connell, supra note 7, at 529-37. 
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Behind concern over individual doctrines in the law of torts, 
premium rates, and proposals for basic changes in the way pro- 
fessional liability is handled, lies an uneasy feeling among many 
professionals about the entire field of professional responsibility. 
Some-perhaps even most-of the changes we are witnessing in 
standards of professional ethics, continuing education, public in- 
volvement in control of the professions, and malpractice liability 
are positive. Yet each development signals a decrease in the 
traditional autonomy of the individual practitioner within his 
profession and of the professions in society. The increasing pub- 
lic regulation and scrutiny of professionals suggest consideration 
of the sharing of responsibility for the results of professional ac- 
tivity. Peter Brown has noted how increasing the professional's 
understanding of the novelties of the client's problems might 
justify such a sharing? 
Another phase of such shared responsibility could involve 
the initiation of joint professional-client determination of their 
respective responsibilities for losses caused by the professional's 
activities on behalf of the client. Elective no-fault is such an ap- 
proach, but it may be too much, too soon. Instead of beginning 
by allowing modification of the compensable event-the most 
difficult aspect of reform-the first step toward reform could ex- 
periment by permitting modification of the measure of compen- 
sation or the payment mechanism. Mandatory changes in these 
elements have in the past been acceptable only in return for ex- 
panding the events for which compensation is available. But as 
the relationship between professional and client becomes less 
paternalistic, changes made at the option of these parties may 
seem more acceptable. 
For example, one major cause of recent premium increases 
is growth in the average amount of damages paid in a successful 
claim. These increases might be tempered by negotiated ceilings 
on the damages recoverable by a client in the event of a mal- 
practice claim? The present standard of care and method of 
25. See P. Brown, Professional Finitude and Informed Consent: Limiting The Lia- 
bility of Non-Medical Professionals (unpublished paper presented at the Symposium on 
Professional Responsibility in Denver, Colorado on July 14, 1977, and on file with the 
Brigham Young University Law Review). 
26. Professor Richard A. Epstein has proposed a similar approach to medical mal- 
practice claims. See Epstein, Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract, 1976 A.B.F. 
RES. J. 87, 130-31. Because of attorneys' unique duties to their clients, special problems 
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payment could remain the same; the client could be permitted 
to purchase first-party umbrella coverage for above-ceiling 
losses. Eventually the professional's liability insurance premi- 
ums might be reduced in proportion to the number and amount 
of limitations agreed upon with his clients. The amount of the 
fees charged by the professional could also be linked to the 
amount of any recovery limitation agreed upon. 
Many professionals would be reluctant to propose a limita- 
tion on their liability for error at the very outset of their em- 
ployment. In addition, many advocates of consumer rights would 
object to the very possibility of such a limitation. Raising this 
question in the context of fee discussions, however, might not 
necessarily be disruptive of the professional-client relationship 
or harmful to the client's interests as a consumer. The discussion 
could acquaint the client not only with the risk of error, but also 
with the general advantages and disadvantages of particular ap- 
proaches to his problem. The greater the client's understanding 
of and participation in the choice of the risks involved in the 
services requested, the stronger the justification for sharing 
these risks. The danger that a professional's superior knowledge 
concerning the potential for loss could result in an unconsciona- 
bly low ceiling might be reduced by prescribing a minimum ceil- 
ing that no agreement could diminish. Another method would be 
to limit the system initially to agreements between professionals 
and sizeable business clients and public organizations, perhaps 
as measured by gross annual income or number of employees. 
The danger that these institutions would be deceived or mislead 
by the professional is slight. 
It might also be charged that a negotiated ceiling approach 
could decrease professional incentive to exercise skill when pro- 
viding services. Of course, the extent to which the current sys- 
tem's gross (or nonexistent) third-party insurance rate classifica- 
tion encourages care is uncertain; whether there would be a 
serious reduction merely from placing a ceiling on damages is 
also questionable. But the problem could be addressed by re- 
quiring that any negotiated ceiling on liability be linked to a 
prohibition on the professional's right to insure against liability 
for a portion of the claim. This practice is already being used in 
would arise in applying this approach to legal services. But even here the authorization 
of public advertising by attorneys may open up the market sufficiently to render bargain- 
ing between attorneys and clients acceptable. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 
(1977). 
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the professions whose liability policies include a deductible or 
exclude the costs of defense from coverage. Higher deductibles 
or coinsurance by the professional (e.g., for twenty percent of 
each claim) could be required whenever a ceiling is placed on 
liability. Professionals would then have a greater financial incen- 
tive to avoid malpractice and would more closely share responsi- 
bility for error with their clients. 
Because of the possibility of a reduction in fees in return for 
limited liability, clients might become more aware of the now- 
hidden cost of professional liability and could join with the pro- 
fessional in determining the proper mix of protections against 
loss. The client's knowledge that the professional would have to 
pay a portion of any claim might tend to discourage some of the 
uncertain number of frivolous actions that are now brought be- 
cause of the availability of third-party payments. 
Another device that might be used to achieve similar results 
would function like a deductible or coinsurance provision be- 
tween professional and client. The two parties might g e e ,  for 
example, that the professional would be liable for only fifty per- 
cent of any judgment entered against him, or that he would not 
be liable for the first $3,000 of any such judgment. In return, the 
client could be offered a variable fee schedule, depending on the 
compensation arrangement that is adopted. 
Use of negotiated ceilings or professional-client coinsurance 
would not revolutionize professional liability. Many clients and 
professionals would not avail themselves of the protection. 
Moreover, the danger that the bargaining process would not be 
free and open is a serious one and would require careful con- 
trols. But the proposals might provide a choice not effectively 
available now, and they could do so with minimal government 
intrusion and without the troubles inherent in the more complex 
alternatives described earlier. Experience with this limited elec- 
tive approach could serve as a model for the continued design of 
more complex alternatives and as an experiment in sharing pro- 
fessional-client responsibility. 
Nonmedical professional liability claims are now subject to 
adjudication in courts of law. Resolving claims via this formal 
process is relatively expensive in both time and money. Prepara- 
tion for trial requires more time than might be necessary if the 
decisionmakers already knew the law and were familiar with the 
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patterns of professional conduct in question. The complexity of 
the facts and issues presented sometimes demands painstaking 
elaboration before a jury of lay people. Although a large percent- 
age of claims are ultimately settled prior to or during trial, the 
last step in the process conditions everything that goes before it. 
The perception that the judicial process is unjust is wide- 
spread among both claimants and professionals. From the pro- 
fessional's point of view, the jury's awareness of the existence of 
liability insurance may create a prejudice in favor of the claim- 
ant. In addition, the process permits adverse publicity and a 
long period of exposure and discomfort. From the claimant's 
point of view, the process is full of formalities which prevent 
describing a claim without artificiality, which delay final resolu- 
tion, and which' promote compromise of legitimate grievances. 
All but the most hardened advocates of trial by jury would 
agree that these criticisms are accurate to some degree. In evalu- 
ating the alternatives, it must be considered (1) whether each 
can achieve its goals-to offer a less expensive, more accurate, or 
less uncomfortable procedure than formal adjudication, and (2) 
what disadvantages would accompany the realization of these 
goals. Because proposals for informalizing nonmedical liability 
disputes are only beginning to surface, systematic arguments on 
their behalf have not emerged.27 Detailed analogues are avail- 
able, however, in recent efforts at medical malpractice reform." 
For purposes of analysis, the descriptions that follow are 
"pure" types. Some of the characteristics of each informal fo- 
rum-the professional board of review, mandatory screening, 
and binding arbitration-could be varied in order to transform 
the forum into a hybrid resembling more than one of these alter- 
natives. The more significant variations are noted in the 
analysis. 
A. Professional Boards of Review 
Some of the dissatisfactions with formal adjudication can be 
reduced by settling claims prior to trial. One way to encourage 
27. For two such proposals, see PENNS~VANU SOCIETY OF ARCHITECTS, supra note 1, 
at 12 (binding arbitration); AMERICAN I STITUTE OF ARCHITECTS LIABILITY REVIEW TASK 
FORCE, FINAL REPORT O THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS 4(1976) (factfinding, mediation, and 
advisory arbitration). 
28. See Baird, Munsterman & Stevens, Alternatives To Litigation, I: Technical 
Analysis, in SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, app. at 214; Note, Medical 
Malpractice Arbitration: A Comparative Analysis, 62 VA. L. REV. 1285 (1976). 
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settlement is to permit the parties to obtain an impartial assess- 
ment of the claim's merits at an early stage in the dispute. Over 
the years, various medical societies (sometimes with the cooper- 
ation of bar associations) have created boards of review to pro- 
vide such assessments of medical malpractice claims. Typically 
the board is composed of physicians who hear the defendant's 
description of the incident prompting the claim and advise him 
whether the claim is defensible. In some programs an attorney 
also sits on the board; in still others, the claimant is allowed to 
participate if he promises to abandon the case if the board finds 
that the required standard of care was followed.29 The board 
may agree in return to provide the claimant with expert testi- 
mony in a subsequent trial if it finds that the claim has merit. 
Participation in the proceedings is voluntary an'd the board's de- 
cision is not admissible into evidence at trial. 
The board of review is designed to provide a preliminary 
estimate of the merits of a claim. As such, it is most likely to be 
successful in encouraging abandonment of clearly frivolous 
claims and settlement of clearly meritorious ones. The most op- 
timistic estimates (based on a limited number of claims) are that 
between fourteen and twenty-nine percent of the medical mal- 
practice claims reviewed under such a procedure advance no fur- 
thePo Some of these, of course, would have been abandoned or 
settled even without the board's review. Provided the cost of 
conducting the proceeding is reasonable (a few hours of every- 
one's time) and participation remains voluntary, experimenta- 
tion with similar forums for review of nonmedical professional 
claims might be worthwhile. 
The paradox of boards of review, however, is that although 
they are designed to provide an alternative to trial by jury, their 
success is likely to hinge on their capacity to preview what 
would occur at trial. Juries, however, have been notably unpre- 
dictable in the area of professional liability. The decision of a 
board composed only of a defendant's professional colleagues, or 
even of a larger number of persons hearing only the defendant's 
side of the case, is not in any event likely to be perceived as a 
reliable index of a lay jury's future reaction. Because boards of 
review traditionally have not made findings concerning damages, 
even a decision for the claimant may not produce a settlement if 
29. See Baird, Mumterman & Stevens, supra note 28, at 224-25. 
30. Id. at 270. 
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the damages issue is disputed. In short, the majority of claims 
would probably proceed beyond the review stage, having en- 
countered an additional layer of procedure and some extra cost 
along the way. 
B. Mandatory Screening 
A second cluster of informal practices may be termed "non- 
binding arbitration" or "pretrial screening". In contrast to the 
professional board of review, screening panel review (as it will be 
called) is mandatory, and generally only one member of the 
panel is a professional colleague of the defendant. Although re- 
view is mandatory, it is nonbinding in that either party is enti- 
tled to trial in a court of law if dissatisfied with the panel's deci- 
sion. Screening panel review of medical malpractice claims has 
been mandated by statute in approximately half the states.s1 
Applied to nonmedical professional liability claims, such a 
system might work as follows. Every claim would be submitted 
to a review panel composed of a member of the defendant's pro- 
fession, an attorney and a lay person.sa The panel would hear 
presentations by both sides and could dispense with the rules of 
evidence when desirable. It would render a decision concerning 
liability and appropriate damages. Either party would have a 
right to reject the panel decision and to require a trial de novo 
in a court of law. The decision of the panel might or might not 
be admissible in evidence at trial. 
The screening panel idea is superficially appealing. Because 
31. See ALASKA STAT. 5 09.55.536 (Supp. 1980); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 12-567 
(Supp. 1980); ARK. STAT. ANN. $ 34-2602 (Supp. 1979); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, $8 6803- 
6814 (Supp. 1980); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 768.44 (West Supp. 1981); HAWAII REV. STAT. $3 
671-11 to -20 (1976); IDAHO CODE $5 6-1001 to -1013 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, $8 
201-214 (SMITH-HURD SUPP. 1980-81); IND. CODE ANN. 5 16-9.5-9 (Burns Supp. 1980); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. $5 65-4901 to -4908 (Supp. 1979); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 40:1299.47 
(West Supp. 1981); MD. CTS. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. $9 3-2A01 TO -2A09 (1980); MASS. 
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, 5 60B (West Supp. 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT. $5 538.010-.080 
(Vernon Supp. 1981); NEB. REV. STAT. $5 44-2840 to -2847 (1978); NEV. REV. STAT. $ 
41A.020 -.OW (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. $8 519-A:1-5 (1974); N.M. STAT. ANN. §$ 41- 
5-14 to -28 (1978); N.Y. JUD. LAW 5 148-a (McKinney Supp. 1980-81); OHIO REV. CODE 
ANN. $ 2711.21 (Page Supp. 1980); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 40, 53 1301.301-.606 (Purdon 
Supp. 1980-81); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 10-19-1 to -10 (Supp. 1980); TENN. CODE ANN. $9 23- 
3401 to -3421 (Supp. 1979); VA. CODE $5 8.01-581.1 to .I21 (1977); Wrs. STAT. ANN. $5 
655.02-.21 (West 1980). 
32. In order to avoid having two attorneys on the board in an attorney malpractice 
case, two lay people could serve. The attorney would then function as both professional 
expert and legal advisor. 
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of the panel's professional and legal expertise, the cost of pre- 
paring and presenting the case might be kept low. This expertise 
could also promote accuracy in the panel's decisions. The pres- 
ence of a layperson could serve to keep the panel honest by im- 
porting the public conscience into the proceeding. Claims could 
be heard speedily, informally, privately, and with as little hostil- 
ity between the parties as possible. Yet the right to a full-scale 
trial in the event of dissatisfaction with the result would be pre- 
served. Lastly, the availability of pretrial screening might allow 
the hearing of valid claims that are currently foreclosed because 
of their low potential recovery. 
Closer analysis discloses a number of reasons to wonder 
whether optimism about mandatory screening is justified. First, 
panel members will surely be more aware of the existence and 
character of professional liability insurance than the average 
jury. Whether the panel would be better able to ignore this 
awareness than supposedly plaintiff-oriented juries is uncertain. 
Second, overall cost savings are uncertain. Although the techni- 
cal and legal expertise of the panel could facilitate presentation 
and decision, the lay person would still have to be educated 
about the claim. Also, the attraction of valid small claims, 
though obviously a beneficial development, would probably be 
accompanied by at least some additional claims without merit. 
This cost would have to be considered in any prospective ac- 
counting. Third, and perhaps most important, mandatory 
screening will suffer from the same flaw encountered by the pro- 
fessional review board; to the extent that a litigant's attorney 
believes a more favorable result might be achieved before a jury, 
settlement will be discouraged, because the losing party will 
have an incentive to reject the panel decision and to elect a trial 
de novo. 
Rejection of the panel decision by the disappointed party 
can be discouraged in a number of ways. The costs of conducting 
the hearing (including panel members' fees) could be assessed, 
along with attorneys' fees against the party rejecting the deci- 
sion if that party also loses at trial; or the panel decision could 
be made admissible in evidence in a subsequent trial. Because 
the panel decision will carry considerable weight with the jury, 
the unsuccessful party would be discouraged from attempting to 
challenge that decision. But these disincentives run a risk of vio- 
lating state constitutional prohibitions against infringing the 
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right to trial by jury? 
Even though putting teeth in the panel decision is constitu- 
tional, doing so will inevitably add to the cost of the proceeding. 
If costs and counsel fees are at stake and the panel decision is 
admissible at a later trial, serious preparation-perhaps resem- 
bling preparation for an actual trial-will have to occur because 
a favorable panel decision is critical to ultimate success. It would 
be manifestly unfair, therefore, to provide for admissibility of 
the panel decision without allowing substantial discovery prior 
to the panel hearing. Whether at this point the cost and charac- 
ter of the proceeding would begin to resemble that of a jury 
trial-the very phenomenon it seeks to avoid-is yet another 
open question. 
There are, of course, possible benefits apart from cost sav- 
ings, to be derived from mandatory screening. One is the poten- 
tial for a relatively small pool of panelists to develop sufficient 
expertise and familiarity with claims to produce some uniform- 
ity in its decisions. The smaller the pools from which panelists 
are chosen, the greater the probability that panelists will sit on 
more than a few claims each year. Few observers would see the 
development of a very small group of decisionmakers as wholly 
desireable, but at least some familiarity with the procedure on 
the part of panel members would be beneficial. Even if results 
do not differ substantially from what would occur at trial, the 
privacy and informality of the proceeding may help the parties 
feel more satisfied that the issues received a fair hearing. 
These nonfinancial advantages of screening will vary, de- 
pending on the nature of the claim and the professional services 
involved. The medical profession has perhaps the strongest ar- 
gument for informal claim resolution. Health is always a per- 
sonal matter; physician-patient relations are most likely to be 
adversely affected by the potential of a lawsuit tried in open 
court. In contrast, the nonmedical professions as a group proba- 
bly have less claim to the need for an informal setting in which 
to resolve disputes. Although many of their relationships are 
33. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp. Ass'n, 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 
(1976). But see the following cases upholding the constitutionality of screening panel 
legislation: Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576,570 P.2d 744 (1977); Carter v. Sparkman, 
335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977); Attorney Gen. v. Johnson, 
282 Md. 274,385 A.2d 57, appeal dismissed, 439 U.S. 805 (1978); Prendergast v. Nelson, 
199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977); State ex re2. Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 
261 N.W.2d 434 (1978). 
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personal, many are also business or commercial relations not de- 
pending heavily on personal factors. 
Distinctions can be drawn not only among the professions, 
but also between the nature of the claim and the identity of the 
claimant. The attorney who drafts form letters for a collection 
agency has less need for an informal claim resolution procedure 
in order to preserve continuing relationships with his clientele 
than does the architect who works with the handicapped in de- 
signing housing to suit their needs. These individual differences 
in the character of relationships and the nature of services sug- 
gest that the value of a pretrial procedure will depend very 
much on the disputes it services. 
In short, mandatory screening will not be able to do all 
things for all cases. Limiting its goals, however, might increase 
the chances of success. For example, the patently unmeritorious 
claims that are not abandoned until the parties reach the court- 
house steps or that result in a directed verdict for the profes- 
sional might be more speedily abandoned after a brief and inex- 
pensive proceeding the decision of which would be inadmissible 
at a later trial. How many such claims are made is unknown. On 
the other hand, a procedure with comparatively full discovery, 
the right to call witnesses, and the opportunity for cross-exami- 
nation might also promote settlement of the more complex 
cases. The cost of resolution would be somewhat reduced in the 
portion of these cases settled after the panel hearing and with- 
out trial. Yet a portion will not be settled and will proceed to 
trial. Because of the additional cost of the mandatory panel 
hearing, the total cost of resolving these claims will have been 
substantially increased. 
Whether any of these procedures would produce a net sav- 
ing is uncertain. This and other questions posed in this discus- 
sion are especially susceptible to empirical research. Two dozen 
state variations employing this basic scheme now process medi- 
cal malpractice claims. A systematic study of their cost, their ef- 
fect on litigant satisfaction, and their impact on the configura- 
tion of claims could provide the architects of this approach to 
nonmedical claims with a great deal of guidance. 
C. Binding Arbitration 
The foremost danger of adopting mandatory screening is 
that the procedure will be ineffective in screening cases. That 
danger is avoided by binding arbitration. A new trial in a court 
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of law is not permitted following binding arbitration, because 
the decision of the arbitration board is final. Compulsory arbi- 
tration of all professional liability claims would probably violate 
most state constitutions. Statutory authorization of voluntary 
binding arbitration, however, is undoubtedly constitutional. Sev- 
eral states have enacted statutes regulating arbitration of health 
care liability claims," and a majority of states have enacted vari- 
ations of the Uniform Arbitration Act, pursuant to which volun- 
tary binding arbitration of professional liability claims is almost 
certainly valid? 
Many of the arguments for mandatory screening can also be 
made in favor of arbitration. For example, the expertise of the 
board might produce more satisfactory decisions; hearings could 
be prepared for and conducted less expensively than a trial by 
jury; a semblance of uniform treatment might result if the arbi- 
tration board sat often enough; a board could be speedily con- 
vened after a claim is made; and the privacy and informality of 
the hearing might be more conducive to both parties' satisfac- 
tion. But unlike mandatory screening, arbitration would rarely 
add a layer of costs to the process. The grounds for appeal 
would be strictly limited-they would be appeals on questions of 
law, not trials de n0v0.~~ 
The similarities between binding arbitration and pretrial 
screening should not obscure this important difference-the 
function of screening is to encourage the settlement of claims; 
arbitration, though it may have conciliatory overtones, is a final 
adjudication. Counsel and the parties will surely react accord- 
ingly. The parties will invest all resources justified by the claim. 
Therefore, only if the nature of the forum itself demands fewer 
resources will savings occur.s7 And because the arbitration hear- 
34. See Au. CODE $ 6-5-485 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.535 (Supp. 1980); Cfi. 
CIV. PROC. CODE 1295 (West Supp. 1980); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 10, $8 201-214 (Smith- 
Hurd Supp. 1980-81); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.. §§ 9:4230 -:4236 (West Supp. 1981); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 600.5040 (Supp. 1980-81); N.D. CENT. CODE $8 32-29.1-01 to -10 
(Supp. 1979); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. $8 2711.01, 2711.21-24 (Page Supp. 1979); S.D. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 21-25B-1 to -26 (1979); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, $3 7001-7008 (Supp. 
1980); VA. CODE. 8.01-581.12 (1977). 
35. For an analysis of the application of these statutes to medical malpractice 
claims, see Wadlington, Alternatives To Litigation, IV: The Law of Arbitration in the 
U.S., in SECRETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, app. at  346. 
36. Arbitration legislation typically allows a decision to be overturned only on very 
limited grounds. See UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT Q§ 12, 13, 19. 
37. For a comparative statistical analysis of defense costa in medical malpractice 
arbitration and trial by jury, see Heintz, Arbitration of Medical Malpractice Claims: Is 
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ing is a final adjudication, the relative amicability that might 
manifest itself in screening panel hearings is less likely to occur 
in arbitration. In short, the finality of arbitration has distinct 
advantages, but this aspect of the approach may also produce 
fewer of the benefits of informality than might otherwise be 
expected. 
A system of arbitration could be (and to a limited extent 
has been) initiated by one or more professions in most jurisdic- 
tions under the auspices of the applicable general arbitration 
statute. Professionals, in cooperation with their insurance carri- 
ers, could produce form arbitration agreements, which could be 
offered to clients when the professional is retained. The option 
to arbitrate could also be offered to claimants (either clients or 
third parties) at the inception of a claim. But agreements pro- 
duced in this fashion run the risk of being invalidated as uncon- 
scionable, because general arbitration statutes provide few of the 
protections necessary to make arbitration of professional liabil- 
ity claims fair and effe~tive.~~ 
The process by which the parties reach agreement to arbi- 
trate and the terms of that agreement are important features of 
any arbitration system. In the professional liability context, the 
parties may be unequal in bargaining power or have unequal ac- 
cess to pertinent information about the advantages and disad- 
vantages of the alternatives. Statutes expressly authorizing and 
regulating arbitration of professional liability claims could clar- 
ify and structure the process to ensure that it is equitable. 
A number of issues should be addressed by any enabling 
statute. First, although making arbitration compulsory for both 
parties is prohibited, a requirement that the professional offer 
the client the arbitration option may be valid.39 Such a require- 
ment would make arbitration compulsory for the professional if 
it is elected by the client. Even if valid, however, this approach 
will have transformed the nature of the procedure-it will no 
longer be a voluntary effort by both parties to settle their dis- 
pute without recourse to the courts. Nevertheless, it must be 
it Cost Effective?, 36 MLL L. REV. 533, 549-51 (1977). 
38. For a discussion of these issues as they arise in the context of arbitration of 
medical malpractice claims, see Henderson, Alternatives to Litigation 111: Contractual 
Problems in the Enforcement of Agreements to Arbitrate Medical Malpractice, in SEC- 
RETARY'S COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 6, app. at 321. 
39. Recent Michigan legislation provides that all contracts insuring hospitals 
against liability shall require the hospital to offer patients the option of executing agree- 
ments to arbitrate claims. See MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. $ 500.3053(1) (Supp. 1980-81). 
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recognized that clients will generally be unaware of the availabil- 
ity of the process and that professionals will be reluctant to dis- 
cuss the possibility of error at the very time they are being em- 
ployed. Without the requirement, substantially fewer claims will 
be made subject to arbitration and resolved out of court. 
Second, an enabling statute should regulate the circum- 
stances under which the offer to enter into an arbitration agree- 
ment may be made and under what conditions, if any, such an 
agreement may be revoked.'O By providing an option to revoke 
an arbitration agreement within a specified period following the 
completion of the professional's services, a client's interests can 
be protected and the validity of most agreements assured with- 
out the excessive prescription of offering conditions. 
Third, the statute should specify the composition of the 
board and hearing procedures. With such matters settled, the 
actual process of agreement would be simplified. In addition, 
eliminating such variation might encourage uniformity and pre- 
dictability of decisions. 
Fourth, the board's obligation to apply the appropriate 
standard of care and the scope of judicial review should be 
clearly specified. General arbitration statutes customarily do not 
allow an appeal for failure of the board to decide in accord with 
existing law. Unless the board has an express obligation to do so, 
its powers will be unclear and the availability of appeal uncer- 
tain. If appeal for error of law is desirable, then the board 
should be required to set forth findings of fact and conclusions 
of law as part of its decision. Otherwise, the courts will be un- 
able to determine the basis of a board's decision and there will 
be no formal constraint on a board's power to alter the applica- 
ble standard of care. Of course, the board could be allowed to 
determine the standard to be applied without regard for existing 
law. But such authority could result in even more variance in 
decisions that exists at present.'l 
Lastly, an enabling statute should include such relatively 
mechanical but important matters as (1) definitions of the pro- 
fessionals and the kinds of services covered, (2) allocation of re- 
sponsibility for payment of costs, (3) method of board selection, 
and (4) the effect of a decision on the defendant's right to con- 
40. See MICH. COW. LAWS ANN. $ 600.5042(3) (Supp. 1980-81), providing patients 
who sign arbitration agreements the right to revoke within 60 days of discharge. 
41. For an analysis of the possible effects of such authority on the variability of 
decisions in medical malpractice arbitration, see Abraham, supra note 10, at 519-20. 
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tribution from joint tortfeasors where fewer than all possible de- 
fendants to a claim are obligated to arbitrate. 
In contrast to formal adjudication in which the decision- 
makers are the claimant's peers, each of the procedures dis- 
cussed in this section relies heavily on professional decision. 
Making a procedure mandatory may therefore raise serious criti- 
cism because many other complicated tort claims will remain 
within the court system. On the other hand, there may be an 
inherent bias in any version of an informal procedure that is op- 
tional. If a procedure turns out to be generally favorable to a 
profession, its members will undoubtedly offer their clients the 
option of agreeing to it. If a procedure seems to favor clients, it 
probably will not be offered. Because, inevitably, more clients 
than professionals will be uninformed about the advantages and 
disadvantages of a particular option, professionals may possess a 
strategic advantage whenever procedures are made ~ptional.~' 
The informality and privacy of the procedures may be valu- 
able, but too much should not be expected of them in this re- 
gard. The professional in each case will have been accused of 
committing malpractice. Professional pride will produce hostility 
whether or not the accusation and hearing are public. In addi- 
tion, aspects of increased privacy and the elimination of formal- 
ity may exacerbate existing problems. Results and trends at the 
informal level will be less accessible to those wishing to make 
predictions or adjust their behavior in reliance on them. This 
low visibility could reduce the deterrent effect of potential liabil- 
ity or encourage defensive practice because of uncertainty about 
the standards to which members of a profession are actually be- 
ing held. Finally, it should be kept in mind that the justice 
achievable by relaxing rules of evidence and limiting (both for- 
mally amd practically) judicial review has two faces. Decisions 
can be fine-tuned to the realities of the dispute, but they can 
also be shielded from the equitable adjustment that appellate 
review would otherwise allow. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The problems related to nonmedical professional liability 
have no magic solution. No single reform can deal with all com- 
plaints about the current system. Moreover, it must be realized 
that many of the possible changes for the better will require pro- 
42. See Note, supra note 28, at 1295. 
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fessionals or clients to surrender something in return. This is not 
a prescription that the status quo be retained, but it is a caution 
that only by careful planning and realistic appraisal of the 
trade-offs entailed in any new approach can successful reform be 
achieved. 
